Contingent Protection, and in particular Antidumping (AD), has grown to become an important trade restricting device in the European Union (EU). This paper analyses whether internal and external macroeconomic pressure may contribute to explain the variations in the intensity of AD policy in the EU. The empirical analysis shows that the filing activity is inversely related to the domestic macroeconomic situation. This result suggests that AD is more a tool of protectionism rather than an instrument to countervail alleged unfair import competition.
I. Introduction
Contingent protection (CP) measures are GATT legal tools of protection. The most important instruments of contingent protection are safeguard measures (article XIX GATT-1994) as well as anti-dumping (AD) measures and countervailing (CV) measures, both based on article VI GATT-1994 . According to Finger (1993) , the GATT recorded more than 2000 CP cases during the 1980s, mostly initiated by the United States, the EU, 1 Canada and Australia. More recently, contingent protection has evolved into a global phenomenon as more and more transition and developing countries established CP-laws and started to make use of these (Miranda/Torres, 1997) .
The growing importance of contingent protection raises the question of its determinants. According to the GATT rules, actions are contingent on industryspecific circumstances: safeguard actions can only be adopted if an increase in imports has caused (or threatens to cause) serious injury to the domestic industry. In case of AD or CV actions, the importing country must demonstrate that imports are dumped and consequently materially injure the domestic industry. Therefore, most studies have adopted an industry-specific perspective to explain the use of contingent protection, while only few studies have investigated whether contingent protection actions may be related to macroeconomic conditions. 2 This paper serves to analyse the macroeconomic determinants of contingent protection policy for the European Union during the period 1980-1998. 3 Unlike previous studies for the US, who have mostly relied on OLS estimation techniques, count data models are employed in order to account for the discrete and non-negative nature of the data generating process. Various specification tests are conducted to derive the most appropriate specification. The plan of the paper is as follows: Section II briefly describes the institutional set up and selected stylised facts of contingent protection in the EU. Section III reviews the relevant literature. In Section IV, we present and discuss the model and our empirical findings. Section V concludes.
III. Macroeconomic Determinants of Contingent Protection
The observed variations in the case activity of EU antidumping policy may be related to macroeconomic determinants. Hereby, two different channels can be distinguished: First, the balance of payment situation may have an impact on the willingness to accept a complaint if the national policy makers pressure the Commission to use trade protection as a tool of expenditure switching. According to this external pressure hypothesis, the number of antidumping cases per year is therefore positively related to a widening in the trade balance deficit or to a real appreciation of the domestic currency. 7 Second, the domestic macroeconomic situation may influence the filing activity of domestic firms: if the domestic macroeconomic activity is sluggish, and unemployment relatively high, any further increase in import competition puts downward pressure on each worker's wage in case he is dismissed. This tends to increase lobbying efforts by unions. Additionally, rent seekers may anticipate that the governments are sensitive to any further increase in imports which threaten to cause layoffs. According to this domestic pressure hypothesis, rent seeking pressures increase in recessions and vent by dumping complaints.
Existing empirical evidence, 8 focussing on the US experience, has confirmed that macroeconomic pressure has an influence on the course of contingent protection policy over time (see table 1 ). Hereby, all studies find that the case activity is related to internal pressure variables approximated by changes in the rate of capacity utilisation and/or the unemployment rate as well as in the level of GNP. 9 The studies however differ in their evaluation of whether external pressure matters or not: evidence in favour of the external pressure hypothesis was provided by Takacs (1981) and Coughlin, Terza and Khalifah (1987) , while evidence indicating their unimportance follows from the work of Feigenbaum and Willet (1985) , Salvatore (1987) and Leidy (1997) . Regarding the estimation tools employed in the different studies, they in most part relied on conventional OLS regression techniques. However, as mentioned in the introduction and 7 Exchange rate swings may also matter in antidumping cases by inducing pricing-tomarket behaviour (Feinberg, 1989 ). Pricing to market occurs when firms do not pass through nominal exchange rate swings into their export prices. When the exporting country's currency is appreciating, WTO rules induce the AD-authority to interpret pricing-to-market by foreign firms as dumping, since foreign export prices expressed in foreign currency are then lower than in their domestic markets.
8
After this study has been completed in September 2000 (see Becker/Theuringer, 2000), a paper by Knetter/Prusa (November 2000) was published which also investigates the relationship between AD filings and macroeconomic conditions using Negative Binomial regression as well as Poisson regression. In addition, they pool data on AD filings from Australia, Canada, the United States and the European Union. They find that internal macroeconomic pressure, approximated by domestic real GDP growth, and external pressure via the real exchange rate have both a substantial impact on AD filing activity.
9
The latter is used by Takacs (1981) and Salvatore (1987) . In a comment to Takacs' study, Feigenbaum/OrtiziWillet (1985) rightly criticize using the level as a proxy for the cyclical condititon. Rather, the growth rate would serve as an appropriate proxy. Among others, we use the growth rate of real GDP in our study. 
IV. Empirical Results

Model Specification
In order to analyze macroeconomic influences on the pressure for antidumping protection, we use the following econometric model:
t=l,...,T, where NUMBERNEW(t) denotes the number of newly initiated AD and CV investigations per year t, IM(t-l) are internal macroeconomic pressures, EM(t-l) external macroeconomic pressures, and IPJAPGR(t-l) is the growth rate of total industrial production in Japan, all in year t-1.
In line with previous studies, our dependent variable is the number of investigations initiated per year (NUMBERNEW) rather than of those cases ending with affirmative decisions on dumping as the adequate measure for the intensity of contingent protectionist pressures. This is because of the investigation effect described in section II. Note once more that high values of the dependent variable may imply either a relatively lenient willingness to accept complaints by the Commission and/or a pronounced filing activity of the domestic industry in a given year. Regarding the independent variables, similar to studies for the US, factors exerting domestic or external macroeconomic pressure are distinguished between. Domestic macroeconomic pressure is approximated by the growth rate of real GDP (GDPGR(t-l)) and by that of the total industrial production (IPGR(t-l)) as well as the percentage change in the unemployment rate (UER(t-l)). We expect the coefficients of GDPGR(t-l) and of IPGR(t-l) to be negative and that of UER(t-l) to be positive. Indicators of external pressure are the real effective exchange rate (REER(t-l)), the trade balance (TB(t-l)), and the ratio of import penetration (IMPPEN(t-l), percentage change from previous period). Under the external pressure hypothesis, the coefficients of REER(t-l) and of TB(t-l) should be negative, 10 while that of IMPPEN(t-l) should be positive. The variables and their description are summarized in table 2.
The growth rate of total industrial production in Japan (IPJAPGR(t-l)) was also included in the regressions as a proxy of the macroeconomic situation of the EU's trading partners. An economic downturn of a major trading partner may have an effect on the number of petitions filed either for reasons independent of the domestic macroeconomic conditions 11 or for those related to the balance of payments. In particular, in a recession, the exporter's domestic (here: the Japanese) markets absorb a considerably smaller share of supply, ceteris paribus increasing the export volume, i.e. the import competition faced by the trading partner (here: the EU) and hence, other things equal, increasing the trading partner's industries' demand for protection. Thus, theory suggests
10
The real effective exchange rate is defined so that an increase represents an improvement in the international competitive position.
11
For an elaboration of this idea see Leidy (1997) .
that IPJAPGR(t-l) should enter the regressions with a negative sign. The Japanese growth rate of total industrial production was chosen as a proxy for these outside influences as it was the most important target of European ADpolicy during the investigation period, if measured by the trade volume affected. By the end of 1996, approximately one third of the total trade affected by ADmeasures referred to imports from Japan.
12
Tab. 2: Dependent and Independent Variables used in the Regressions
Abbreviation Description
Dependent variable NUMBERNEW(t) Total number of newly Initiated antidumping and antisubsidy cases per period Independent variables
Macroeconomic activity:
Growth rate of real gross domestic product per period IPGR(t-1)
Growth rate of total Industrial production per period UER(t-1) Unemployment rate per period (percentage change from previous period) International trade position:
Real effective exchange rate per period TB(t-1)
Trade balance per period IMPPEN(M) Import penetration per period (= Imports/GDP, percentage change from previous period) Further control variables:
Growth rate of total industrial production in Japan per period NUMBERNEW(M)
Total number of newly initiated antidumping and antisubsidy cases per period (lagged dependent variable)
Note: The independent variables were lagged one period in order to account for the lagged effects of the variables on the economy and in order to avoid the possibility of reverse causation.
The lagged dependent variable NUMBERNEW(t-l) was included in order to model potential dependencies across time periods. A significantly negative sign would suggest a .depletion effect' a la Leidy (1997) : the higher the number of petitions is in a year t, the more the stock of potential petitions in the following year t+1 is depleted. According to Leidy, the depletion effect indicates the "safety value" nature of AD petitions. In case of macroeconomic downturns, protectionist pressure intensifies and is vented by AD petitions, which in turn, implies reduced demand for protection in the subsequent period. Hence, ceteris paribus, less petitions should be filed and also the acceptance rate of petitions in year t+1 may depend negatively on the number of cases opened in the preceding year.
13
12
The number of cases initiated against Japanese firms during the period of investigation was 42.
13 Leidy (1997) suggests that this is due to the stock of petitioners being finite and the petitions remaining under consideration during the following year.
Finally, it was attempted to account for the introduction of the new antidumping regulation in the EU that came into force following the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements in 1995. In order to control for a possible "regime change" in European AD policy, a dummy variable was added equalling one for the years 1995-1998 and zero for the years before.
Specification Analysis
Due to the discrete and non-negative nature of the dependent variable NUMBERNEW, the normal linear regression model cannot constitute a valid data generating process. Rather, the formally correct way is to use a count data model, whose distributional assumptions account for the heteroscedastic and skewed distribution inherent to non-negative data and their discreteness. However, for large counts -like our dependent variable -the normal linear model might provide a reasonable approximation. Every regression equation was estimated 14 under the different distributional assumptions imposed by the Poisson, negative binomial maximum likelihood, and Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) count models. 15 As for the regressors, one proxy each was inluded for the domestic macroeconomic activity and the international influence via trade, as well as the growth rate of total industrial production in Japan. The lagged dependent variable, NUMBERNEW(t-l), was eliminated from a regression for redundancy reasons when insignificant. Combining each of the domestic and international variables gives nine regression equations per specification. This procedure serves three purposes. First, changing the control variables provides a sensitivity analysis of the regression results for the different regressors. Second, changing specification further analyses sensitivity, allowing for a comparison of the impact of each specification on the regression results. Third, specification tests enable one to draw inferences on the nature of the data generating process.
The regression results for the Poisson, the negative binomial, and the Poisson QML specification of each of the nine equations are given in tables Al, A2 and A3, respectively in appendix A. It is noted here that a remarkable robustness of the regression results is found across the specifications with signs being identical in all cases but one, and the level of significance only differing for IPJAPGR(t-l) and NUMBERNEW(t-l).
14
The analysis was conducted using the computer package Econometric Views 3.1.
15
The Poisson regression model is the simplest count data model and can be considered as the benchmark model. However, if its assumptions are violated, estimation with this model cannot be efficient, and use of the Poisson standard errors would lead to biased inference. Therefore, we estimated each regression with these three specifications and conducted various tests in order to eliminate the appropriate specification for each regression. Details for why we used the specifications mentioned above, and the specification analysis itself are presented in Appendix A.
Regression Results
For ease of exposition, table 3 displays the regressions used for inference resulting from the specification analysis. As a general indicator of the goodness of fit of the model, the Wald or likelihood ratio tests 16 of the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of all included explanatory variables except the constant term strongly reject H 0 at the 1% or 5% (2.5% in these cases) level of significance for all equations; i.e. the variation in the regressors explains to a significant degree the variation in the dependent variable.
Autocorrelation of the residuals was tested for up to the twelfth lag with the Ljung-Box-Q-statistic of H Q : residuals are serially uncorrelated. In none of the regressions could H 0 be rejeced.
The regression results indicate that during the period 1980-98 the filing rate of antidumping and antisubsidy cases in the European Union was positively related to macroeconomic pressure. Looking at the individual variables, there is strong evidence for the hypothesis that pressures for antidumping protection in the EU are inversely related to the domestic macroeconomic situation. Equations 1 to 6 show high significance with the expected negative sign of the growth rate of real GDP (GDPGR(t-l)) and of total industrial production (IPGR(t-l)), and with the expected positive sign of the unemployment rate (percentage change from previous period, UER(t-l)). Thus, our results indicate that over the period under investigation, the more AD-investigations were initiated the lower was the growth of real GDP or of total industrial production, or the higher were the rates of unemployment. This suggests that in case of a macroeconomic downturn either industries file more petitions and/or the European CP-authority is more lenient in accepting requests for investigations.
Regarding external pressures approximated by the international trade position, we find strong insignificance of all three proxies. Thus our results do not indicate that a real (effective) appreciation of the EU countries' currencies implies a higher number of cases launched. Also, the insignificance of both the real effective exchange rate and the trade balance in particular suggest that the AD mechanism is not used for balance of payments reasons. Including import penetration (percentage change from previous period, IMPPEN(t-l)) leads to insignificance of the domestic macroeconomic variables, too, or, in the case of UER(t-l), strongly reduces the level of significance. This is, however, no evidence for a lack of robustness of the significance of the domestic
16
The likelihood ratio statistic is not valid for the Poisson QML model. Therefore, for the corresponding equations (1-4 in table 5) the Wald statistic was calculated using the computer package Gauss, for conducting a Wald test of the same null hypothesis. Recognizing that the coefficient vector is asymptotically normally distributed so that its square product with the inverse of the variance covariance matrix is N 2-distributed macroeconomic variables but rather due to the high correlation of IMPPEN AA with GDPGR, IPGR and UER (0.81, 0.82, and -0.83, respectively), which inflates the standard errors of the collinear variables and thus reduces significance. Accordingly, likelihood ratio tests of the joint insignificance of IMPPEN(t-l) and each of the domestic macroeconomic proxies strongly rejected H 0 at the 1 % level of significance. The signs of the correlations suggest that at the aggregate level, import penetration might rather serve as an alternative proxy for macroeconomic activity. Comparing the impact of the domestic macroeconomic conditions and that of the international competitive factors on protectionist pressures, we can conclude that our evidence suggests a much more important impact of the former than of the latter.
Turning to the growth rate of industrial production in Japan, the results indicate quite a robust positive significance. Insignificance in equations 2 and 4 is likely due to multicollinearity introduced in the equations by IPJAPGR(t-l) and TB(t-l) (the correlation coefficient is 0.61). Deleting TB(t-l) from the regression leads to significance of IPJAPGR(t-l) at the 10 % level.
17 A likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of the two variables in equations 2 and 4 highly rejected H 0 at the 5 % level of significance. The sign of IPJAPGR(t-l) is, however, contrary to what was expected. The positive sign might indicate that despite the inverse correlation of the growth rate of total industrial production and the volume of total exports, there may be a positive relation to the share of exports to the European Union. This could be the case if exports to the EU were mainly in goods with a low price elasticity of demand in Japan, so that a fall in IPJAPGR(t-l) would not necessarily result in a surge of these exports. However, this reasoning is contradicted by the positive sign of the correlation of IPJAPGR and TB. 18 As it stands, the sign is rather puzzling, and this may be an interesting issue for further research, also on the sectoral level.
The sign of the lagged number of newly initialized antidumping investigations, NUMBERNEW(t-l), suggests, when significant, existence of the Repletion effect' Leidy (1997) finds for the US. However, the significance is not robust to changes in the explanatory variables.
Finally, our regressions do not support the view that changes in the European trade defensive policy regulations agreed on in the Uruguay Round have exerted a significant change in the course of contingent protection policy in the EU as the coefficient of the included Uruguay Round dummy was insignificant 19 in all equations. 
17
Deleting IPJAPGR(t-l), however, leaves TB(t-l) insignificant suggesting that the insignificance of TB(t-l) is not due to the correlation.
18
Also, this reasoning implies an effect of IPJAPGR(t-l) via the trade balance which, however, is found to be insignificant.
19
Due to their insignificance the regression results are not reported but available on request. The dummy variable was added to the regressions displayed in table 5.
20
Of course, however, tests for structural change in regressions with a low number of observations should be interpreted even more carefully than the regressions themselves, so it would be interesting to repeat this exercise in some years time when more observations will be available.
IV. Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to investigate the impact of the macroeconomic conditions on the pressure for contingent protection in the European Union. Similar to previous studies for the United States, we distinguished between domestic and external pressures. Our main results indicate that the domestic macroeconomic situation is strongly inversely related to pressures for contingent protection approximated by the number of newly initiated antidumping and antisubsidy cases. This result is robust to changes in the proxies for the macroeconomic pressure. However, with respect to external pressures all proxies were found to be insignificant. We also attempted to test for potential effects of the legislative changes implemented in 1995 after the Uruguay Round agreements. Our results suggest that (so far) there has been no significant change in the course of contingent protection policy in the EU as a result of these decisions. However, the investigation period 1980-98 only covers 18 annual observations so it may be worth repeating the exercise in a couple of years when more observations are available.
The regression results are remarkably robust to changes in the underlying model specification. Different count data model specifications were employed in order to account for the discrete and non-negative nature of the dependent variable, and various tests were conducted to derive the appropriate specification for each of the estimated equations.
Concluding, similar to evidence for the United States, the presented estimations indicate a strong impact of the domestic macroeconomic situation on the pressure for contingent protection in the European Union. External factors do, however, not seem to play a major role.
Appendix A: Specification Analysis
As outlined in section IV.2, the normal linear regression model cannot constitute a valid data generating process for discrete non-negative data. In the following, a specification analysis is conducted the result of which are the regressions used for inference displayed in table 5. The simplest count data model, the Poisson model, is the starting point of the analysis. Its probability density function is given by
Prob (7, = y t )= -!• , t=l,...,T (Al), where X denotes the Poisson parameter equal to the mean and the variance of the Poisson distribution. Typically, the Poisson regression model is given by
where x t is the (1 x k) vector of regressors and P is the (t x 1) vector of coefficients. The parameters can be estimated with maximum likelihood techniques. The Poisson maximum likelihood estimator resulting from maximization is consistent and efficient provided the conditional meanfunction is correctly specified and the conditional distribution of the dependent variable y t is Poisson. If, however, the underlying distribution is not Poisson, the Poisson estimator, even though still consistent, will no longer be efficient, and use of the Poisson standard errors would lead to biased inference. The empirically most relevant case is a violation of the Poisson restriction that the mean must equal the variance. Most commonly, the violation of this assumption will be such that the data are characterized by overdispersion, i.e. the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean. 21 In this case, the negative binomial model is an often used alternative to the Poisson model since its variance always exceeds the mean and it can so potentially accommodate for overdispersion. The negative binomial regression model takes the form 22 log/j f = P'x t +»?,
, where n t is the conditional mean, r) t reflects the specification error as in the normal linear regression model, with exp(r) t ) Gamma distributed. If, however, the underlying distribution is not negative binomial either, the negative binomial maximum likelihood estimator will be both inefficient and inconsistent.
21
The consequences of either over-or underdispersion (consistency but inefficiency, biased variance covariance matrix) resemble those of heteroscedasticity in the normal linear regression model. Provided the mean is correctly specified Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimation will then yield consistent estimators even if the distribution is incorrectly specified.
23
In order to test for the validity of the Poisson assumptions, three different tests were employed: those suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (1990) and by Wooldridge (1996) for testing mean variance equality and a likelihood ratio test of the Poisson against the negative binomial model. 24 The latter exploits the fact that the Poisson distribution is obtained as a parametric restriction of the negative binomial distribution.
25 Table 7 
25
For the model equations presented above, t] t = 0.
26
Even though the Poisson model is rejected in equations 1-4, it is interesting to note that it does quite well in this application in general as compared to microeconometric applications, given the relatively low level of significance of rejection (10%). This is basically due to the values of the dependent variable being relatively high, and a too large number of zeros playing no role. 
